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6 IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
8 AT SEATTLE

9 RUSSELL BRANDT,

10 Plaintiff,

11 vs.

12 COLUMBIA CREDIT SERVICE, INC., a  
13 Delaware Corporation, WALES &  
14 WOEHLER, INC., P.S., a Washington  
15 Corporation, JASON L. WOEHLER,  
WSBA Number 27658, and SACOR  
FINANCIAL, INC., a California  
Corporation,

16 Defendant.

NO. 2:17-cv-00703-RSM

**WALES & WOEHLER & JASON  
WOEHLER'S RESPONSE TO MOTION  
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

17  
18 COMES NOW defendants Wales & Woehler, Inc., P.S. and Jason L. Woehler  
19 (collectively "W&W"), and submit the following response to plaintiff's motion for  
20 summary judgment on liability.

21 **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

22 W&W does not dispute the overall statement of facts provided by plaintiff,  
23 except insofar as said statement of facts is incomplete, as set forth below. W&W's  
24 position is that, at all times, it complied with the requests of it's client. W&W provided

1 Sacor with the exculpatory documents provided by plaintiff to Sacor, and was advised  
2 that said documents did no provide sufficient proof to Sacor that the matter had been  
3 settled and paid. See Declaration of Frank Huguenin.

4 Notably, plaintiff settled with Sacor, separate and apart from W&W, and now  
5 seeks to augment its recovery by proceeding against W&W.

6 With respect to plaintiff's Second Requests for Admission, said requests were  
7 not answered as none of them are denied. Taking all of them as admitted, they do  
8 not, alone, prove any liability by W&W.

## 9 **ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY**

### 10 A. Summary Judgment Standard

11 Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any  
12 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.  
13 Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court views the  
14 facts, as well as all rational inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the  
15 non-moving party. *Scott v. Harris*, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). The court must only  
16 consider admissible evidence. *Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA*, 285 F.3d 764  
17 (9th Cir. 2002). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence  
18 of any genuine issues of material fact. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323  
19 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to identify specific facts  
20 showing there is a genuine issue of material fact. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*,  
21 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). There must be evidence on which a jury could  
22 reasonably find for the plaintiff and a "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in  
23 support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient." *Id.* at 252. Additionally, a fact

1 is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at  
2 248. A material fact is “genuine” where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury  
3 could find in favor of the non-moving party. Id.

4 B. Disputes as to Material Facts exist.

5 There are several material facts in dispute. First and foremost, plaintiff’s declaration,  
6 in paragraph 16, indicates that Mr. Brandt called and spoke with Attorney Woehler,  
7 explained that he had paid, and that Mr. Woehler called him a liar. Mr. Woehler made  
8 a policy of not speaking to debtor defendants directly. Moreover, had he done so, he  
9 would not have called the defendant a name. Said paragraph claims that he  
10 contacted Mr. Woehler “numerous times” to explain that he had settled. Beyond Mr.  
11 Brandt’s assertion, there is no evidence of this and Mr. Woehler denies it.

12 Second, in paragraph 17 of his declaration, Mr. Brandt indicates that that he  
13 had sent W&W proof of payment prior to the supplemental proceedings, and that Mr.  
14 Woehler told him it was not properly endorsed. In reality, W&W never received any  
15 documentary evidence or offer of proof of payment prior to the supplemental  
16 proceedings. As such, Mr. Woehler would never have commented on the  
17 endorsement one way or another, as he had not seen it. Mr. Brandt may well have  
18 sent this material to Sacor, but he did not send it to W&W. See Declaration of Jason  
19 Woehler.

20 Third, plaintiff’s motion states that W&W proceeded with garnishment of Mr.  
21 Brandt after being provided with proof of payment/settlement of the claim. See page  
22 5, paragraph numbered 4. Plaintiff alleges W&W refused to quash the writ of  
23 garnishment. Notably, plaintiff provides no evidence that W&W had any proof of  
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1 payment. There was also no request made, formally or informally, for the writ to be  
2 quashed. Rather, Woehler continued to follow the instructions of Sacor in the matter.  
3 Sacor consistently denied that the claim had been settled. See Declaration of Jason  
4 Woehler.

5 Fourth, it is notable that Sacor, in responding to Brandt's motion to vacate, still  
6 refused to acknowledge that they had been provided with sufficient proof of payment.  
7 See Plaintiff's Exhibit N and O. In fact, Sacor's counsel indicates in her declaration  
8 that "Sacor Financial has been unable to verify any facts other than that it never  
9 received the payment identified in Brandt's motion. Exhibit O at paragraph 6. This is  
10 entirely contrary to the record, as Mr. Huguenin's declaration and attached e-mails  
11 indicate. Sacor has disingenuously misled the superior court as to its knowledge and  
12 review of plaintiff's allegations of payment.

13 Fifth, as plaintiff shows by providing Sacor's collection notes (Plaintiff's exhibit  
14 V), Sacor made no notation of the materials provided to Sacor by Mr. Huguenin  
15 following the supplemental proceedings on May 7, 2015. Sacor has consistently  
16 denied to all parties that any settlement existed.

17 These facts are material as to W&W for two reasons. First, plaintiff is  
18 attempting to tax W&W with damages that, if they exist at all, exist from Sacor's  
19 refusal to either fully investigate plaintiff's claim of settlement, or to willfully ignore said  
20 claim. W&W, upon receipt of Mr. Brandt's alleged settlement, immediately sent the  
21 same to Sacor, who then refused to acknowledge that it was proof of settlement.  
22 Following that, Sacor continued to instruct W&W to proceed with post-judgment  
23 collection efforts. W&W provided plaintiff's proof of payment to Sacor (which Sacor  
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1 had apparently been provided with previously) and was told it was not sufficient proof.

2 See Declaration of Frank Huguenin. As such, W&W followed the instructions of it's  
3 client, who was clearly in the best position to investigate the alleged payment.

4 Second, plaintiff's motion seems to fiat that somehow W&W is responsible for  
5 the actions of Sacor. Notice that there is no declaration, transcript or any sworn  
6 statement from Sacor in support of this motion. Sacor received the materials  
7 provided by W&W and determined that it was insufficient proof of payment/settlement.

8 See Exhibits to declaration of Frank Huguenin. It is well settled that an attorney is  
9 not automatically liable for the acts of his or her client. The Ninth Circuit has  
10 recognized vicarious liability under the FDCPA. *Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection*  
11 *Servs., Inc.*, 460 F.3d 1162, 1173 (9th Cir. 2006). Yet, the Ninth Circuit found that  
12 "there is no legal authority for the proposition that an attorney is generally liable for  
13 the actions of his client." *Id.* General principles of agency form the basis of vicarious  
14 liability under the FDCPA. *Id.*

15 In the present case, W&W provided Sacor with all material given to them by  
16 plaintiff. Sacor reviewed the same, according to the e-mail from Jon Tubbs, and  
17 refused to accept it as proof of settlement or payment. Thereafter, Sacor instructed  
18 W&W to proceed with additional collection efforts. See Declaration of Mr. Huguenin.

19 As set forth in the Declaration of Mr. Huguenin, Sacor was in the optimum  
20 position as the successor in interest to Columbia Credit, to investigate these matters.  
21 The continuously denied the existence of this agreement and payment, and instructed  
22 W&W to proceed. As such, Sacor is driving the vehicle, not W&W, and nothing set  
23 forth in plaintiff's motion establishes otherwise.

1 **CONCLUSION**

2 W&W acted at the behest and direction of its client, Sacor Financial. The only  
3 time W&W was provided with proof of payment was following the supplemental  
4 proceedings. W&W then forwarded that material to Sacor, who denied that it  
5 constituted sufficient proof of settlement or payment. Every action taken by W&W was  
6 at the behest of Sacor. W&W relied upon Sacor to investigate the payment alleged, as  
7 W&W had no access to any method to verify the same. Sacor relentlessly asserted  
8 that there was no payment/settlement, and continued to instruct W&W to proceed with  
9 collection efforts.

10 DATED this 5th day of March, 2018.

11  
12 */s/Jason L. Woehler*

13 By:\_\_\_\_\_

14 Jason L. Woehler, WSBA #27658  
15 Attorney for Defendants Wales and Woehler and  
16 Jason L. Woehler  
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